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Abstract 
Using data for a large panel of countries, this paper investigates the role played by income 
inequality and fiscal stimuli episodes in shaping the likelihood of political stability. By means 
of Tobit estimations, we show that a rise in inequality increases the probability of government 
crises. However, such adverse distributional effect is reduced when expansionary or 
increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli episodes or successful fiscal stimuli programs are put 
in place. 
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1. Introduction 
Income inequality is a major source of political instability. Yet, in the aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, many governments implemented large fiscal stimuli 
measures, which were subsequently reversed as concerns about the lack of sustainability of 
public finances started accumulating. 
Moreover, despite some recent advances on the assessment of the relationship between 
fiscal policy and income inequality (Agnello and Sousa, 2014; Furceri et al., 2015), our 
understanding about the effects of a widening of the income gap and the use of discretionary 
fiscal policy actions on the occurrence of government crises is still far from clear cut.  
Additionally, it is well-known that fiscally constrained governments tend to become 
less popular when they implement fiscal consolidation programs, especially, in countries with 
a strong income inequality. However, if fiscal adjustments are perceived as necessary and 
contribute to narrowing the income gap, the impact of inequality on political stability might 
be dampened. Thus, this paper aims at contributing to this discussion from an empirical 
perspective. 
Our results show that rising income inequality makes government crises more likely to 
occur. Additionally, governments that implement fiscal stimuli are more likely to avoid the 
political unrest associated with an uneven distribution of income when those programs are 
successful in the sense of being followed by a large reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Yet, 
such measures need to be increasingly expansionary to reduce the prospects of government 
crises in a significant manner. 
Moreover, some features of incumbent legislature (i.e. whether there is a 
parliamentary majority or a coalition in power), a few characteristics of the political system 
(such as, the durability of the regime or the degree of competitiveness) and the level of 
democracy appear to be key for political stability. 
In what follows, Section 2 describes the related literature and our main contribution to 
it. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology and the data used in the analysis. Section 
4 provides the empirical findings. Section 5 discusses the major conclusions. 
 
2. An overview of the related literature: where do we stand and what do we add to it? 
The research on the linkages between political instability and real economic activity 
typically shows that poor growth has a detrimental effect of the probability of re-election of 
incumbent government in democratic regimes or tends to increase the likelihood of coups in 
dictatorships and military regimes, thus creating incentives for policymakers to implement 
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sub-optimal policies (Kramer, 1971; Londregan and Poole, 1990). More political instability 
may also be associated with lower growth in the context of weak human capital accumulat ion 
or productivity growth (Aisen and Veiga, 2013).
1
 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the joint dynamics of political instability 
and inflation. For example, Paldam (1987) shows that, in Latin America, there is a significant 
relationship between the likelihood of military regimes and the inflation rate, but only a few 
regimes survive inflationary crises. The empirical evidence provided by Aisen and Veiga 
(2008a, 2008b) also suggests that more political instability is associated with a high level or 
volatility of inflation, but this link is particularly strong when financing conditions are limited 
and there is a lack of central bank independence. 
A third line of investigation looks into the impact of the institutional framework on 
political instability. In this context, more fragmented parliamentary systems are seen as a 
cause for less government stability (Taylor and Herman, 1971). 
Given the current start of the art, it is worth highlighting that only a few works 
investigate the link between political instability and income inequality. Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) use data for 70 countries over the period 1960-1985 and show that income inequality 
increases the probability of government crises, because it generates social discontent. From an 
historical perspective, the authors note that several South East Asian countries - notably, the 
"four dragons" (i.e. Hong Hong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) -, have been politically 
stable since the Second World War as a result of land reforms that reduced the income gap 
and the wealth inequality. In contrast, Latin American countries suffered from a more 
political instability as a consequence of a very unequal income distribution. Similarly, for a 
sample of  131 countries over a the period 1960-1995, Posner (1997) finds that average 
incomes in a society and, to a lesser extent, income equality are effective instruments to 
promote political stability. And, using data for a panel of 18 Latin American countries over 
the period 1971-2000, Blanco and Grier (2009) uncovers an inverted U-shaped effect of 
income inequality on political instability. 
Moreover, despite the renewed attention on the impact of large fiscal adjustments on 
growth (Lambertini and Tavares, 2007), a detailed assessment of the effects of fiscal stimuli 
on political stability has not been conducted so far. Indeed, the related pieces of research have 
investigated how fiscal retrenchments affect the lack of political stability instead, and 
_____________________________ 
1 For instance, Martins and Veiga (2014) find that the size of the government (as a percentage of GDP) has a 
nonlinear impact on human development, with the effect being particularly large in developed economies and 
high-income countries. 
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concluded about the relevance of: (i) fiscal austerity measures (Paldam, 1987); (ii) IMF 
stabilisation programs (Haggard et al., 1995); (iii) political cycles (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; 
Alesina et al., 1998); and (iv) the cabinet ideology (i.e. left- versus right-wing) (Tavares, 
2004). 
From a slightly different perspective, Agnello and Sousa (2013) emphasize that fiscal 
prudence is crucial for economic prosperity. Agnello et al. (2013) stress that a sound macro-
fiscal environment is key for the success of fiscal consolidations, and Cafiso and Cellini 
(2014) show that tax-based fiscal consolidation programs are more detrimental for the 
dynamics of the public debt-to-GDP ratio than spending-based fiscal consolidations. 
We contribute to the existing literature as follows. First, we specifically test for the 
existence of a "direct" link between fiscal stimuli, income inequality and political instability 
(as proxied by government crisis episodes). The idea is to assess whether income equality and 
discretionary expansionary fiscal policies can be regarded as effective instruments to promote 
political stability. 
Second, given the strong relationship between income inequality and fiscal adjustment 
programs (Agnello and Sousa, 2014; Furceri et al., 2015), we investigate whether the use of 
expansionary fiscal policy discretion can be though as a transmission mechanism via which 
income inequality affects political stability (i.e. the "indirect" link). To the extent that 
expansionary fiscal programs are perceived to have positive wealth and redistributive effects 
(by reducing post-tax income inequality), they can also promote government stability. 
Finally, because of the crucial role played by the composition of fiscal adjustments 
(Alesina and Ardagna, 2010), we identify several measures of fiscal stimuli with the aim of 
assessing their impact on political stability. These are avenues of research that previous 
theoretical and empirical works have not fully addressed. Yet, they are important dimensions 
to be considered for a better understanding of the relationship between income inequality, 
fiscal stimuli and political (in)stability. With the current paper, we aim at filling these gaps. 
 
3.  Methodology and Data 
3.1. Econometric Model 
We start by analysing the relationship between income inequality, fiscal stimuli 
episodes and government stability by estimating the following panel data model: 
,,,,,, tititititi YFGiniGovCrisis                                     (1) 
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where GovCrisisi,t denotes, for each country i at time t included in the sample, our proxy of 
government instability, Ginii,t denotes the income inequality index, Fi,t is a binary variable 
that takes the value of one when a specific fiscal stimuli episode occurs, and zero otherwise, 
and Yi,t is a variable that tracks the dynamics of real economic activity, namely, the real GDP 
growth rate. 
Next, we check whether the effects of income inequality on government stability 
change during periods of fiscal stimuli episodes, i.e. we look at the interaction between 
income inequality and fiscal stimuli by running the following regression: 
 .,,,,,,, tititititititi YFGiniFGiniGovCrisis                           (2) 
Given that the empirical evidence suggests that fiscal consolidations tend to widen the income 
gap (Agnello and Sousa, 2014; Furceri et al., 2015), we expect that the impact of inequality 
on government stability, conditional on the implementation of fiscal stimuli, is dampened. 
Finally, we extend the baseline model to include a set of control variables for the 
political and the institutional frameworks, Xi,t. We follow the same procedure as before: we 
start by estimating the direct effect of each variable; then, we allow for the interaction 
between inequality and fiscal stimuli. Thus, we regress the following models:  
  ,,,,,,, titititititi YFGiniGovCrisis   γX                          (3) 
 .,,,,,,,, titititititititi YFGiniFGiniGovCrisis   γX            (4) 
Given the specific nature of our dependent variable (see section 3.2), all regressions 
are fitted using a Tobit model and a maximum likelihood estimator (Miranda and Rabe-
Hesketh, 2006; Finlay and Magnusson, 2009). In particular, because the government 
instability variable is bounded by zero from below and the number of cases in which it takes 
the value of “zero” is especially large compared to the number of cases in which it takes a 
positive value, the use of an OLS estimator or limited dependent variable models (such as, the 
probit or the logit) would render biased estimates. In fact, there would be a downward-bias in 
the estimate of the slope coefficients and an upward-bias in the estimate of the intercept 
associated with these frameworks. The tobit regression overcomes the difficulties associated 
with such econometric methodologies. Finally, to account for potential reversal causality 
between variables GovCrisisi,t  and Yi,t , the latter is instrumented using its own first two lags. 
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3.2. Data 
Our dataset consists of a large panel of 157 countries between 1960 and 2010 for 
which we are able to identify fiscal stimuli episodes.
2
 
The dependent variable, GovCrisisi,t , is Government Crisis, which counts the number 
of "... any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present 
regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow." (Banks and Wilson, 2013). 
This variable is provided by the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS), where it 
is labelled as "S17F4 Government Crises".
3
 
Net (i.e. post-tax, post-transfer) income Gini inequality index data comes from the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). This measure accounts for the 
concept, definition of income and recipient unit, tracks different points in the income 
distribution and measures the level and the trend of income inequality in a harmonized 
manner (see Nolan et al. (2011) for further details). Moreover, it covers a large number of 
countries (namely, 153) and a long period of time (annual data exists in an unbalanced form 
since 1960), thus, easing comparability across countries and over time (Solt, 2009). The 
SWIID employs a transparent procedure, whereby it combines information about the Gini 
index from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) and from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS). Then, the data are standardized via a missing-data statistical algorithm. We focus 
on the net of taxes' income definition instead of the gross income definition in order to capture 
the differences in cross-national redistributive policies (see Ostry et al. (2014)), which may 
lead to significant gaps between inequality in gross and net income. 
The cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAPB) is obtained from the IMF’s WEO and 
is computed using the statistical approach proposed by Blanchard (1990). Public debt data 
_____________________________ 
2 In order to save space, the full list of countries included in the analysis is not reported in the paper. However, it 
is available from the authors upon request. The presence of missing values for several variables and the limited 
time span of fiscal variables, especially, in the case of developing countries, reduces the number of countries 
included in each model specification. Please refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in this study. 
3 The CNTS dataset contains a wide range of domestic conflict event rata (such as, anti-government 
demonstrations, assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, major government crises, purges, riots and 
revolutions), legislative process data (namely, the competitiveness of nominating process, the effectiveness and 
the size of legislature, the number of seats of the largest party in legislature, and the party coalitions and 
legitimacy), political data (such as, the changes in effective executive, the degree of parliamentary responsibility, 
the legislative effectiveness and selection, the number of coups d'Etat, the number of legislative elections, the 
number of major constitutional changes, the number of major cabinet changes, the party fractionalization index, 
the size of cabinet and the type of regime). Due to data availability and country coverage, we use Government 
Crisis as our measure of political instability. 
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come from the Historical Public Debt Database gathered by the Fiscal Affairs Department of 
the IMF (Ali Abbas et al., 2011). Fiscal stimuli episodes are defined as follows: 
 Fiscal stimulus. A period of fiscal stimulus corresponds to a year in which the 
CAPB deteriorates by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP. This definition follows the 
work of Alesina and Ardagna (2010). The authors argue that the choice of such 
threshold allows one to rule out small, but prolonged over time, fiscal stimuli 
episodes and, thus, to focus on large, sharp and brief adjustments in the fiscal 
stance. 
 Expansionary fiscal stimulus. It denotes a period of fiscal stimulus followed by a 
positive GDP growth for two consecutive years. Thus, like Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010), we allow for a reasonable time lag in the generation of real effects by 
fiscal stimuli programs. 
 Increasingly expansionary fiscal stimulus. It refers to a period of fiscal stimulus 
followed by an increasing GDP for two consecutive years. Compared to the 
previous one, this definition allows to account for a sustained growth path.  
 Successful (Unsuccessful) fiscal stimulus. It corresponds to a period of fiscal 
stimulus followed by the cumulative reduction of the debt to GDP ratio greater 
(smaller) than 4.5 percentage points over two consecutive years after the beginning 
of a fiscal stimulus, which is in line with the definition presented in the work of 
Alesina and Ardagna (2010). 
At this point, a caveat should be made. We are aware that while the Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010)’s approach is easy to apply, it is known that it might detect episodes that are 
not really a fiscal stimulus.
4
 This is why authors as Romer and Romer (2010) and Devries et 
al. (2011) embark in the narrative approach.
5
 While the use of a narrative approach would be 
ideal, existing datasets only include the identification of fiscal consolidations, not fiscal 
expansions, and for a limited number of advanced economies.
6
 In addition, the literature 
addressing the identification of fiscal episodes is vast and has, for a long time, relied on 
changes in the CAPB. While some drawbacks surrounding this approach have been recently 
_____________________________ 
4 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
5 Romer and Romer (2010) use a “narrative record” of budget laws, Congressional reports, executive branch 
documents and presidential speeches to identify the size, timing, and motivation for major tax policy actions. 
Devries et al. (2011) identify episodes of large fiscal adjustments by looking at IMF and OECD historical reports 
and checking what countries intended to do when the reports were published. This policy action-based approach 
makes use of descriptive historical facts that usually depict what happened to the public deficit in a particular 
period but do not go into the details of policymakers' intentions and discussions or congressional records. 
6 More specifically, it covers 17 OECD countries over the period 1978-2009. 
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highlighted, it is the best one to cover a heterogeneous sample of 157 countries.
7
 In face of 
some serious concerns, an alternative “narrative approach” was developed, which relies on the 
identification of fiscal episodes based on concrete policy decisions. Proponents of this 
approach argue that the estimated size of the fiscal measures during the identified episodes 
have the advantage of not being affected by the cycle (since their construction is bottom up), 
can minimize identification problems, and are unlikely to embody risks of reverse causation 
(Guajardo et al., 2014). However, the narrative approach could also have some limitations.
8
 
The variable used to control for the economic environment, real GDP growth rate, 
was collected from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  
The set of institutional variables (X) is obtained from the World Bank's Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI), the Polity IV Database (Polity IV) and the CNTS and includes:  
 military (DPI): this dummy variable takes the value of one if the Chief Executive 
is a military officer, and zero otherwise.  
 stabs (DPI): it provides information about the veto points in the decision making 
process and the constraints that face by governments in the course of policy 
implementation by counting the percentage of veto players who drop from the 
government in a specific year.  
 system (DPI): it takes the value of zero in the case of a presidential system, the 
value of one in the case of an Assembly-elected presidential system, and the value 
of two in the case of a parliamentary system.  
 govfrac (Polity IV): it measures the probability that two deputies picked at random 
from among the government parties will be of different parties, thus, capturing the 
degree of government fragmentation. 
 polity2 (Polity IV): it describes how democratic a country is by subtracting the 
country's score in an "Autocracy" index from its score in a "Democracy" index. 
This generates a polity scale ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 
(strongly democratic). 
 durable (DPI): it counts the number of years that a cabinet has been in power, up 
to the current year. A fall of the cabinet in its first year in power is counted as one, 
_____________________________ 
7 The statistical approach may generate an upward bias towards evidence corroborating non-Keynesian effects 
(Afonso and Jalles, 2014). Non-policy factors (including price fluctuations) can affect the computation of CAPB. 
Additionally, fiscal measures include the discretionary reaction to the dynamics of real economic activity. 
8 In particular, it largely relies on judgment calls, and it may not entirely eliminate endogeneity problems (that is, 
fiscal policy reacting to output performance and not the other way around). 
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and each time the government terminates the variable is reset to one in the year 
after the termination. 
 polcomp (Polity IV): it tracks the degree of political competition that the 
incumbent is expected to face in the next election in account of the policy 
decisions made over the administration cycle. 
 yrsoffc (DPI): it is simply the number of years that the chief executive has been in 
office. 
 maj (DPI): this dummy variable takes the value of one if the cabinet has majority 
support in parliament, and zero otherwise. 
 party_coal (DPI): this dummy variable is equal to one if a coalition cabinet 
(including ministers from two or more parties) is in power, and zero otherwise. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Political Instability, Inequality and Fiscal Stimuli 
We begin by analysing the effect of income inequality and fiscal stimuli on the 
likelihood of government crisis episodes. Thus, first, we estimate the baseline model; and, 
then, we move to the analysis of the interaction effects. In both cases, we take into account the 
heterogeneity of the countries considered in the sample, by distinguishing between developed 
and developing/emerging countries. 
Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients for our baseline model. In censored 
frameworks (such as, the tobit model) and, in particular, for explanatory variables that are 
binary (such as, our fiscal stimuli dummy variables), the partial derivatives of the regression 
function do not have a simple interpretation.
9
 However, for continuous variables (such as, 
most of the controls included in our specifications), a straightforward way to obtain the 
marginal effects in the tobit model is simply to multiply each estimated coefficient by the 
fitted probability of the model. Therefore, we can rely our inference on the direct analysis of 
the estimated coefficients, as their signs are the same as those of the resulting marginal effects 
evaluated at the means of the control variables. 
Starting by the influence of the economic environment, our empirical findings show 
that economic growth contributes to stable legislature, corroborating the findings of Aisen and 
Veiga (2008a, 2008b). In light of the magnitude of the coefficient associated with real GDP 
_____________________________ 
9 See Greene (2012, pp. 848-850). 
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growth, the baseline model suggests that the performance of the economy is, perhaps, the 
most important determinant of political stability. 
Moving to the analysis of the impact of inequality on political instability, our results 
clearly suggest that when the income gap increases, the number of government crisis rises. 
This, in turn, highlights that countries which fail to address the problem of inequality in their 
income distribution are more susceptible to face social polarization and, hence, generate an 
unstable political environment. 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. ] 
Next, we consider the different typologies of fiscal stimuli episodes as detailed in 
Section 3.2 above, namely: (i) fiscal stimuli, (ii) increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli, (iii) 
expansionary fiscal stimuli, (iv) successful fiscal stimuli, and (v) unsuccessful fiscal stimuli. 
It can be seen that episodes of fiscal stimuli are not associated with more unstable political 
environments per se. In fact, results suggest that fiscal stimuli episodes do not significantly 
reduce the occurrence of government crises. This can occur since the effect of fiscal stimuli 
may not be independent from a given country’s level of income or a given country’s level of 
income distribution. We will explore this issue next. First, we check whether there are 
significant differences between developed (OECD) and developing and emerging (non-
OECD) countries (Table 2); then, we account for the interactions between income inequality 
and the fiscal stimuli variables (Table 3); a separate analysis of the models allowing for the 
interaction terms will also be performed for the two separate sub-samples of OECD and non-
OECD countries (Table 4). 
Results reported in Table 2 for the OECD and non-OECD countries are in line with 
the findings obtained for the whole sample, but slightly weaker as the number of observations 
is smaller in each sub-sample. In what concerns the fiscal variables, no statistically significant 
effects are found in either of the cases. This means that heterogeneity is not driving the impact 
of fiscal stimuli on the occurrence of government crises. However, while the economic 
environment is more important for the non-OECD sub-sample, income inequality plays a 
major role on political instability in the group of richer countries. 
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. ] 
In the next set of regressions, we condition the effect of inequality and fiscal stimuli 
episodes on political instability by interacting the (net income) Gini inequality index with the 
various fiscal stimuli variables and assess whether their impact on a government crisis is 
influenced by the way they inter-relate. 
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Results are summarized in Table 3 and show that despite the interaction effects, 
income inequality remains having a statistically significant impact on political instability. 
Even though this effect is not significantly altered during the implementation of fiscal stimuli 
programs (see column 1), when they are increasingly expansionary, the detrimental impact 
that income inequality has on political instability is abated (see column 2). However, the 
implementation of that kind of programs seems to cause an increase in the overall degree of 
political instability. Political interests could be driving this result. On the contrary, if fiscal 
stimuli programs are successful, they seem to promote a greater degree of consensus among 
the political agents and political instability is reduced. Nevertheless, some economic agents 
seem to benefit more from that “success”, as the effect of inequality is increased when 
successful fiscal stimuli programs are implemented (see column 4). Regarding the other king 
of programs, no statistically significant effects are found. 
All in all, these findings interestingly suggest that in countries where income 
distribution is uneven, governments implementing fiscal stimuli programs are more likely to 
avoid political instability if they end up being successful. Yet, such programs need to be 
increasingly expansionary (in the sense that they generate positive sustainable growth) to be 
able to significantly reduce the likelihood of government crises. 
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. ] 
When accounting for the sample’s cross-section heterogeneity (OECD versus non-
OECD countries) in our analysis, we confirm that successful fiscal stimuli programs are also 
“successful” in reducing government crises. Results reported in Table 4 also show that in the 
group of OECD countries, this effect is reinforced if the program is expansionary. 
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE. ] 
 
4.2. Political Instability and the Role of Political and Institutional Controls 
Table 5 reports results accounting for the role of the additional political and 
institutional controls. With the inclusion of this set of variables, the impact of the economic 
environment is less significant, but income inequality keeps driving the increase in the 
number of government crises. 
Regarding the institutional variables, we observe that the percentage of veto players 
who drop from the government (stabs), the number of years that a cabinet has been in power 
(durable), the level of political competition (polcomp) and whether the government consists 
of a coalition or not (party_coal), exert a statistically significant impact on government crises. 
These variables have a statistically significant negative effect on the number of government 
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crises, in line with conventional wisdom. In particular, the regime durability (durable) 
reduces the number of government crises and the level of political competition (polcomp) 
seems to pave the ground for more political stability. On the contrary, parliamentary systems 
(system) and more democratic countries (polity2) seem to ignite government crises. In what 
concerns the political regime (polity2), evidence suggests that the more democratic a regime 
is, the more political instability the country will face. 
As for other controls, the fact of a government has a majority of seats in the 
parliament (maj) has only a marginally weak negative effect on political instability, but 
military regimes (military), the level of government fractionalization (govfrac) and the 
number of years in office of the chief executive (yrsoffc) have not proved to have a significant 
impact on the number of government crisis. 
Despite the inclusion of political and institutional controls, episodes of fiscal stimuli 
are not influencing the political environment: overall, fiscal stimuli episodes do not 
significantly reduce the occurrence of government crises. This evidence is not only observed 
for the whole sample, but also in the separate sub-sample analysis for OECD and non-OECD 
countries (see Table 6). However, income inequality is still driving political instability mainly 
in the group of OECD countries. In what concerns to the effects of the institutional variables, 
some differences are observed. While political instability increases with the degree of 
democracy in both groups, parliamentary systems are only relevant in the case of OECD 
countries. The percentage of veto players who drop from the government and regime 
durability are beneficial for political stability also only in this group. On the contrary, political 
competition and party coalitions have proven to be significant for the number of government 
crises only in the non-OECD sub-sample. Moreover, majority governments and the number of 
years in office of the chief executive are negatively correlated with government crises in this 
sub-sample, while military regimes have the same effect as in OECD countries. 
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE. ] 
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE. ] 
As before, in the next set of regressions, we control for the interactions between the 
(net income) Gini inequality index and the various fiscal stimuli variables. Results for the 
entire sample are reported in Table 7. In general, the empirical evidence remains unchanged 
for the economic, political and institutional variables, so we will focus the analysis on the 
inequality effects, fiscal variables and the respective interaction terms. 
Regardless of the inclusion of the institutional controls, the positive effect of income 
inequality on the number of government crises remains highly statistically significant. This 
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impact does not substantially change during the implementation of a particular fiscal stimuli 
program, but, as inferred before, if the program is increasingly expansionary, the negative 
effect of the Gini index on political instability is significantly abated (Column 2). The 
drawback of this effect is that the implementation of these programs ends up causing an 
increase in the overall level of political instability, unless the program turns out to be 
successful (Column 4). However, as found in the analysis without the institutional controllers, 
some people benefit more from that “success” than others, as the effect of inequality is 
increased when successful fiscal stimuli programs are implemented. Once again, no 
significant effects are found for the other types of programs. 
[ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE. ] 
Table 8 shows the results for the separate sub-samples: OECD vs non-OECD. The 
main aspect to be emphasized here is that when we account for the sample’s cross-section 
heterogeneity, we reach the same conclusion as before: successful fiscal stimuli programs are 
also “successful” in reducing the number of government crises. 
[ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE. ] 
 
4.3. Regional Effects 
To shed some light on the potential linkages between geographical location and 
government crises, we split the sample in regional sub-samples:: Europe, North America, 
Asia-Pacific (APAC), Latin America and Africa. 
The empirical results are reported in Tables 9-10. Overall, they show that income 
inequality exerts a very significant and positive impact on the number of episodes of 
government crises in both the European and North American set of countries, while the 
underlying economic environment has proven to be relevant only in the group of European 
countries. Moreover, our results confirm that expansionary and/or successful fiscal stimuli 
programs help promoting a more stable political framework in these two groups of countries. 
In the other three groups reported, no statistically significant results are found. 
[ INSERT TABLE 9 HERE. ] 
[ INSERT TABLE 10 HERE. ] 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we employed a panel of 157 countries over the period 1960-2010 to 
investigate how income inequality and fiscal stimuli affect episodes of government crisis. 
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We found that political instability increases when inequality rises, especially in the 
case of OECD countries. 
Our results also reveal that expansionary and increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli 
can contribute to more political stability. Additionally, our findings suggest that in countries 
where income distribution is uneven, governments implementing fiscal stimuli programs are 
more likely to avoid political instability when those programs are successful. Yet, they need 
to be increasingly expansionary to be able to significantly reduce the prospects of government 
crises. 
Additionally, we found that the existence of a coalition government, the regime 
durability, the degree of political competitiveness and the percentage of veto players who 
drop from the government reduce political instability, while the kind of the political system 
and the degree of democracy boosts the likelihood of government crises. Thus, our empirical 
evidence confirms the pivotal importance of the quality of political institutions as an 
"antidote" against government crises. 
Finally, on the macroeconomic front, economic growth emerged as a crucial driver of 
political stability.  
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List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Political instability, inequality and fiscal stimuli. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate -0.1471** -0.1436** -0.1423** -0.1453** -0.1466** 
 [0.074] [0.068] [0.071] [0.069] [0.072] 
Inequality 0.0231** 0.0228** 0.0227** 0.0221** 0.0226** 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
fiscal stimuli -0.1263     
 [0.263]     
increasingly expansionary fiscal 
stimuli  
 -0.2062    
  [0.375]    
expansionary fiscal stimuli   -0.0345   
   [0.249]   
successful fiscal stimuli    0.1416  
    [0.354]  
unsuccesful fiscal stimuli     -0.2259 
     [0.283] 
Constant -2.8792*** -2.8884*** -2.8949*** -2.8964*** -2.8535*** 
  [0.473] [0.462] [0.468] [0.464] [0.481] 
Observations 1,260 1,260 1,260 1,249 1,252 
𝜒2  0.472 0.465 0.449 0.526 0.436 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 0.492 0.495 0.503 0.468 0.509 
Note: IV estimation of Tobit model. Wald test of exogeneity is reported at the bottom of the table. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2: Political instability, inequality and fiscal stimuli: OECD versus non-OECD countries. 
 OECD countries non-OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate -0.2249 -0.2065 -0.2106 -0.2028 -0.2264 -0.1378* -0.1383* -0.1357* -0.1345* -0.1379* 
 [0.179] [0.162] [0.167] [0.154] [0.184] [0.081] [0.076] [0.078] [0.078] [0.078] 
Inequality 0.0358* 0.0330* 0.0335* 0.0347* 0.0344* 0.0128 0.0125 0.0128 0.013 0.0115 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
fiscal stimuli -0.3026     -0.1138     
 [0.530]     [0.307]     
increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli   0.2477     -0.4653    
  [0.730]     [0.427]    
expansionary fiscal stimuli   -0.0548     -0.0834   
   [0.465]     [0.295]   
successful fiscal stimuli    -0.4539     0.2313  
    [0.766]     [0.389]  
unsuccesful fiscal stimuli     -0.2512     -0.3092 
     [0.574]     [0.334] 
Constant -3.2593*** -3.2796*** -3.2666*** -3.3192*** -3.2300*** -2.3414*** -2.3175*** -2.3556*** -2.4275*** -2.2620*** 
  [0.735] [0.721] [0.721] [0.725] [0.755] [0.826] [0.810] [0.816] [0.832] [0.840] 
Observations 571 571 571 571 571 689 689 689 678 681 
𝜒2  0.0507 0.0599 0.0511 0.0299 0.0642 0.523 0.544 0.524 0.527 0.488 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 0.822 0.807 0.821 0.863 0.8 0.47 0.461 0.469 0.468 0.485 
Note: IV estimation of Tobit model. Wald test of exogeneity is reported at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 19 
Table 3: Interactions between inequality and fiscal stimuli. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate -0.1466** -0.1360** -0.1420** -0.1424** -0.1456** 
 [0.074] [0.068] [0.071] [0.070] [0.072] 
inequality 0.0196* 0.0274*** 0.0214* 0.0182* 0.0248** 
 [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] 
inequality x fiscal stimuli 0.0149     
 [0.020]     
fiscal stimuli -0.7305     
 [0.867]     
inequality x increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli   -0.0617**    
  [0.030]    
increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli   2.2682*    
  [1.273]    
inequality x expansionary fiscal stimuli   0.0059   
   [0.021]   
expansionary fiscal stimuli   -0.2754   
   [0.873]   
inequality x successful fiscal stimuli    0.1141**  
    [0.048]  
successful fiscal stimuli    -5.1583**  
    [2.303]  
inequality x unsuccessful fiscal stimuli     -0.0129 
     [0.022] 
unsuccesful fiscal stimuli     0.2808 
     [0.882] 
Constant -2.7443*** -3.0730*** -2.8452*** -2.7442*** -2.9423*** 
  [0.520] [0.482] [0.515] [0.471] [0.517] 
Observations 1,260 1,260 1,260 1,249 1,252 
𝜒2  0.467 0.344 0.442 0.445 0.416 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 0.494 0.558 0.506 0.505 0.519 
Note: IV estimation of Tobit model. Wald test of exogeneity is reported at the bottom of the table.  
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Interactions between inequality and fiscal stimuli: OECD versus non-OECD countries. 
 OECD countries non-OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate -0.2249 -0.2032 -0.2035 -0.203 -0.2196 -0.1380* -0.1290* -0.1350* -0.1355* -0.1332* 
 [0.178] [0.163] [0.166] [0.154] [0.185] [0.081] [0.076] [0.079] [0.078] [0.078] 
inequality 0.0174 0.0340* 0.0139 0.032 0.0199 0.0119 0.0193 0.0157 0.0045 0.0227 
 [0.025] [0.020] [0.024] [0.021] [0.022] [0.020] [0.018] [0.020] [0.018] [0.020] 
inequality x fiscal stimuli 0.0608     0.0031     
 [0.044]     [0.033]     
fiscal stimuli -2.312     -0.2524     
 [1.413]     [1.540]     
inequality x increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli   -0.0196     -0.0616    
  [0.076]     [0.039]    
increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli   0.8821     2.2453    
  [2.652]     [1.740]    
inequality x expansionary fiscal stimuli   0.0695*     -0.0103   
   [0.042]     [0.034]   
expansionary fiscal stimuli   -2.3538*     0.3751   
   [1.422]     [1.534]   
inequality x successful fiscal stimuli    0.0689     0.1417**  
    [0.045]     [0.065]  
successful fiscal stimuli    -3.2544**     -6.4800**  
    [1.644]     [3.147]  
inequality x unsuccessful fiscal stimuli     0.0629     -0.0505 
     [0.052]     [0.034] 
unsuccesful fiscal stimuli     -2.2936     1.8934 
     [1.609]     [1.537] 
Constant -2.6859*** -3.3185*** -2.6721*** -3.2319*** -2.7855*** -2.3016** -2.6266*** -2.4824** -2.0391** -2.7599*** 
  [0.782] [0.748] [0.781] [0.747] [0.745] [0.988] [0.877] [0.980] [0.851] [0.975] 
Observations 571 571 571 571 571 689 689 689 678 681 
𝜒2  0.0766 0.053 0.0394 0.031 0.0619 0.523 0.396 0.513 0.524 0.419 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 0.782 0.818 0.843 0.86 0.803 0.469 0.529 0.474 0.469 0.517 
Note: IV estimation of Tobit model. Wald test of exogeneity is reported at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Results with political and institutional controllers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate -0.1445* -0.1311* -0.1406* -0.1358* -0.1361* 
 [0.081] [0.075] [0.078] [0.076] [0.078] 
military 0.0511 0.0792 0.0693 0.0525 0.0393 
 [0.418] [0.418] [0.419] [0.424] [0.414] 
stabs -0.7567** -0.7329** -0.7517** -0.7311** -0.7563** 
 [0.358] [0.361] [0.358] [0.366] [0.363] 
system 0.3515** 0.3383** 0.3446** 0.3406** 0.3559** 
 [0.157] [0.154] [0.155] [0.154] [0.156] 
govfrac 0.3183 0.3078 0.3083 0.3369 0.2709 
 [0.378] [0.377] [0.377] [0.384] [0.378] 
polity2 0.2759*** 0.2655*** 0.2762*** 0.2510*** 0.2732*** 
 [0.073] [0.072] [0.073] [0.074] [0.074] 
durable -0.0094*** -0.0088*** -0.0094*** -0.0089*** -0.0093*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
polcomp -0.3949*** -0.3768*** -0.3929*** -0.3491** -0.3882*** 
 [0.135] [0.134] [0.135] [0.138] [0.137] 
yrsoffc -0.0388 -0.0403 -0.0386 -0.0386 -0.0366 
 [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] 
maj -1.0543* -1.0074 -1.0436* -1.0295 -0.9966 
 [0.627] [0.622] [0.627] [0.636] [0.633] 
party_coal -0.4447*** -0.4475*** -0.4420*** -0.4351*** -0.4474*** 
  [0.159] [0.159] [0.159] [0.163] [0.160] 
inequality 0.0377** 0.0363** 0.0372** 0.0366** 0.0365** 
  [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
fiscal stimuli -0.4124     
 [0.265]     
increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli   -0.4351    
  [0.385]    
expansionary fiscal stimuli   -0.3842   
   [0.255]   
successful fiscal stimuli    -0.0027  
    [0.352]  
unsuccesful fiscal stimuli     -0.4907* 
     [0.278] 
Constant 0.0884 -0.0454 0.0638 -0.2626 0.0311 
  [1.226] [1.218] [1.227] [1.232] [1.226] 
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,058 1,061 
𝜒2  0.0011 0.0036 0.000861 0.00366 0.00307 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 0.974 0.952 0.977 0.952 0.956 
Note: IV estimation of Tobit model . Wald test of exogeneity is reported at the bottom of the table. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Results with political and institutional controllers: OECD versus non-OECD countries. 
 OECD countries non-OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate -0.2943* -0.2596 -0.2746* -0.2503 -0.3044* -0.0962 -0.0909 -0.0985 -0.0889 -0.0891 
 [0.174] [0.162] [0.164] [0.153] [0.177] [0.101] [0.094] [0.098] [0.098] [0.096] 
military -8.0639*** -8.3541*** -8.1899*** -8.0878*** -8.2975*** 0.0616 0.1091 0.0814 0.0771 0.0546 
 [1.238] [1.114] [1.174] [1.249] [1.142] [0.412] [0.408] [0.412] [0.417] [0.407] 
stabs -1.0636* -0.9773 -1.0480* -0.9879 -1.0659* -0.6919 -0.7029 -0.6966 -0.6561 -0.6931 
 [0.611] [0.610] [0.611] [0.604] [0.611] [0.462] [0.464] [0.459] [0.471] [0.472] 
system 0.9887* 0.9154* 0.9769* 0.9495* 0.9548* 0.1091 0.1077 0.1021 0.0939 0.1101 
 [0.505] [0.487] [0.504] [0.499] [0.497] [0.197] [0.194] [0.193] [0.195] [0.194] 
govfrac 0.2413 0.3475 0.2754 0.3275 0.2457 0.5079 0.5002 0.4965 0.5285 0.4373 
 [0.778] [0.786] [0.782] [0.791] [0.778] [0.486] [0.481] [0.485] [0.495] [0.488] 
polity2 1.3479** 1.4000** 1.3562** 1.3699* 1.3822** 0.1985*** 0.2020*** 0.2009*** 0.1860** 0.2031*** 
 [0.664] [0.704] [0.679] [0.700] [0.664] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.075] [0.075] 
durable -0.0149*** -0.0146*** -0.0148*** -0.0145*** -0.0149*** -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0013 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
polcomp -0.8528 -0.7881 -0.8288 -0.7958 -0.839 -0.2567* -0.2627* -0.2588* -0.2375 -0.2620* 
 [0.536] [0.568] [0.543] [0.563] [0.543] [0.149] [0.150] [0.149] [0.153] [0.152] 
yrsoffc -0.0467 -0.0489 -0.0457 -0.0457 -0.0511 -0.0468* -0.0466* -0.0464* -0.0451 -0.0435 
 [0.063] [0.063] [0.063] [0.063] [0.064] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] 
maj 0.3182 0.3793 0.3728 0.4778 0.2618 -1.3427** -1.3116** -1.3463** -1.3369** -1.2650* 
 [1.474] [1.480] [1.472] [1.472] [1.485] [0.645] [0.643] [0.645] [0.659] [0.651] 
party_coal -0.6547 -0.6471 -0.6474 -0.6396 -0.6626 -0.4982*** -0.4927*** -0.4933*** -0.4860*** -0.4913*** 
  [0.413] [0.416] [0.415] [0.418] [0.412] [0.169] [0.168] [0.169] [0.175] [0.170] 
inequality 0.1282*** 0.1279*** 0.1288*** 0.1291*** 0.1275*** -0.0038 -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0031 -0.0036 
  [0.039] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] [0.039] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] 
fiscal stimuli -0.7046     -0.2632     
 [0.458]     [0.313]     
increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli   0.1513     -0.7871*    
  [0.664]     [0.450]    
expansionary fiscal stimuli   -0.4935     -0.3382   
   [0.426]     [0.300]   
successful fiscal stimuli    -0.7541     0.1966  
    [0.632]     [0.382]  
unsuccesful fiscal stimuli     -0.6358     -0.486 
     [0.477]     [0.342] 
Constant -9.4967** -10.8178** -9.9692** -10.6280** -9.8165** 1.6968 1.6991 1.7448 1.407 1.6404 
  [4.716] [4.779] [4.738] [4.749] [4.748] [1.361] [1.364] [1.364] [1.389] [1.368] 
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 574 574 574 564 567 
𝜒2  0.345 0.392 0.319 0.243 0.493 0.103 0.171 0.0849 0.106 0.173 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 0.557 0.531 0.572 0.622 0.482 0.748 0.679 0.771 0.744 0.677 
Note: IV estimation of Tobit model. Wald test of exogeneity is reported at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Results with political and institutional controllers and interactions between inequality 
and fiscal stimuli. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate -0.1440* -0.1147 -0.1405* -0.1297* -0.1345* 
 [0.081] [0.076] [0.078] [0.077] [0.078] 
military 0.0375 0.1739 0.0672 0.0375 0.0483 
 [0.421] [0.412] [0.421] [0.424] [0.414] 
stabs -0.7618** -0.6873* -0.7525** -0.6952* -0.7428** 
 [0.358] [0.359] [0.359] [0.363] [0.365] 
system 0.3510** 0.3269** 0.3446** 0.3401** 0.3563** 
 [0.157] [0.152] [0.155] [0.155] [0.156] 
govfrac 0.3002 0.3359 0.3063 0.3025 0.2784 
 [0.376] [0.377] [0.375] [0.384] [0.377] 
polity2 0.2735*** 0.2703*** 0.2759*** 0.2521*** 0.2749*** 
 [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.074] [0.074] 
durable -0.0094*** -0.0089*** -0.0094*** -0.0091*** -0.0093*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
polcomp -0.3927*** -0.3774*** -0.3925*** -0.3541*** -0.3899*** 
 [0.135] [0.134] [0.135] [0.137] [0.138] 
yrsoffc -0.0398 -0.0367 -0.0387 -0.0396 -0.0358 
 [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] 
maj -1.0399* -1.0602* -1.0423* -1.0361 -1.0076 
 [0.626] [0.614] [0.625] [0.632] [0.629] 
party_coal -0.4421*** -0.4753*** -0.4418*** -0.4186** -0.4496*** 
  [0.159] [0.159] [0.160] [0.164] [0.160] 
inequality 0.0341** 0.0427*** 0.0368** 0.0328** 0.0386** 
 [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] 
inequality x fiscal stimuli 0.0139     
 [0.019]     
fiscal stimuli -0.9708     
 [0.842]     
inequality x increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli -0.0872***    
  [0.029]    
increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli   3.0355**    
  [1.263]    
inequality x expansionary fiscal stimuli   0.0017   
   [0.020]   
expansionary fiscal stimuli   -0.4521   
   [0.858]   
inequality x successful fiscal stimuli    0.1170**  
    [0.051]  
successful fiscal stimuli    -5.4224**  
    [2.498]  
inequality x unsuccessful fiscal stimuli     -0.0109 
     [0.021] 
unsuccesful fiscal stimuli     -0.0696 
     [0.865] 
Constant 0.2188 -0.2637 0.0784 -0.1031 -0.0502 
  [1.252] [1.215] [1.247] [1.226] [1.249] 
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,058 1,061 
𝜒2  0.00092 0.0663 0.00076 0.00102 0.00588 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 0.976 0.797 0.978 0.975 0.939 
Note: IV estimation of Tobit model. Wald test of exogeneity is reported at the bottom of the table.. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8: Results with political and institutional controllers and interactions between inequality and fiscal stimuli: OECD versus non-OECD countries. 
 OECD countries non-OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate -0.3259* -0.2359 -0.2912* -0.2476 -0.3363* -0.0956 -0.0764 -0.0982 -0.0839 -0.0876 
 [0.180] [0.169] [0.167] [0.154] [0.181] [0.101] [0.096] [0.098] [0.098] [0.096] 
military -8.5035*** -8.3518*** -8.4379*** -8.6055*** -8.3759*** 0.0373 0.1912 0.0687 0.0573 0.1051 
 [1.187] [1.117] [1.179] [1.289] [1.259] [0.414] [0.412] [0.414] [0.414] [0.410] 
stabs -1.0766* -0.9235 -1.0580* -0.9649 -1.1024* -0.709 -0.6613 -0.7047 -0.5846 -0.6308 
 [0.611] [0.610] [0.611] [0.605] [0.614] [0.465] [0.457] [0.461] [0.466] [0.473] 
system 0.8665* 0.9832* 0.8914* 0.9489* 0.8392* 0.1148 0.0737 0.1043 0.1006 0.0978 
 [0.498] [0.517] [0.503] [0.496] [0.491] [0.198] [0.196] [0.194] [0.193] [0.196] 
govfrac 0.1954 0.3313 0.2403 0.3033 0.214 0.4701 0.5593 0.4789 0.4428 0.4894 
 [0.777] [0.791] [0.783] [0.793] [0.775] [0.483] [0.484] [0.482] [0.490] [0.488] 
polity2 1.4220** 1.3863** 1.4096** 1.3768* 1.4452** 0.1965*** 0.2067*** 0.1995*** 0.1766** 0.2035*** 
 [0.690] [0.702] [0.704] [0.704] [0.685] [0.074] [0.075] [0.074] [0.074] [0.075] 
durable -0.0148*** -0.0148*** -0.0147*** -0.0143*** -0.0151*** -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0009 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
polcomp -0.8249 -0.7696 -0.8071 -0.7972 -0.8125 -0.2538* -0.2719* -0.2566* -0.2169 -0.2597* 
 [0.541] [0.566] [0.545] [0.564] [0.549] [0.149] [0.152] [0.150] [0.150] [0.152] 
yrsoffc -0.0513 -0.044 -0.0482 -0.0435 -0.0556 -0.0483* -0.0439 -0.0473* -0.0475* -0.0408 
 [0.063] [0.064] [0.063] [0.063] [0.064] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] 
maj 0.2332 0.5355 0.3336 0.4372 0.2611 -1.2983** -1.4097** -1.3290** -1.3433** -1.3533** 
 [1.459] [1.495] [1.459] [1.470] [1.468] [0.642] [0.631] [0.641] [0.648] [0.640] 
party_coal -0.6594 -0.68 -0.6505 -0.6531 -0.6524 -0.4939*** -0.5135*** -0.4922*** -0.4670*** -0.4973*** 
  [0.413] [0.419] [0.415] [0.422] [0.411] [0.169] [0.168] [0.170] [0.176] [0.171] 
inequality 0.1163*** 0.1343*** 0.1204*** 0.1274*** 0.1161*** -0.009 0.0039 -0.007 -0.0123 0.0049 
 [0.042] [0.041] [0.042] [0.040] [0.041] [0.021] [0.019] [0.021] [0.019] [0.020] 
inequality x fiscal stimuli 0.0528     0.0193     
 [0.043]     [0.033]     
fiscal stimuli -2.4081     -1.1289     
 [1.534]     [1.545]     
inequality x increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli -0.073     -0.0787**    
  [0.071]     [0.039]    
increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli   2.486     2.6736    
  [2.619]     [1.815]    
inequality x expansionary fiscal stimuli   0.0386     0.0097   
   [0.042]     [0.034]   
expansionary fiscal stimuli   -1.73     -0.7743   
   [1.448]     [1.579]   
inequality x successful fiscal stimuli    0.1014     0.1589***  
    [0.062]     [0.062]  
successful fiscal stimuli    -4.8935**     -7.2694**  
    [2.393]     [3.049]  
inequality x unsuccessful fiscal stimuli     0.0598     -0.0408 
     [0.046]     [0.035] 
unsuccesful fiscal stimuli     -2.5587     1.304 
     [1.601]     [1.543] 
Constant -9.7394** -11.2554** -10.2040** -10.5920** -10.0338** 1.9026 1.4458 1.8485 1.7233 1.27 
  [4.712] [4.871] [4.717] [4.755] [4.701] [1.411] [1.378] [1.420] [1.358] [1.414] 
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 574 574 574 564 567 
χ2 0.609 0.234 0.47 0.237 0.747 0.11 0.296 0.0894 0.148 0.182 
Prob > χ2 0.435 0.628 0.493 0.626 0.388 0.74 0.586 0.765 0.701 0.669 
Note: IV estimation of Tobit model. Wald test of exogeneity is reported at the bottom of the table..Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9: Regional analysis I. 
 Europe North America 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate -0.2431** -0.2234** -0.2361** -0.2177** -0.2322** -0.3912 -0.1536 -0.3912 -0.5706 -0.1151 
 [0.098] [0.097] [0.096] [0.090] [0.098] [0.609] [0.340] [0.609] [0.414] [0.317] 
inequality 0.1436*** 0.1331*** 0.1436*** 0.1368*** 0.1355*** -0.8320** -0.8606** -0.8320** -0.4608** -0.7455** 
 [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.360] [0.368] [0.360] [0.223] [0.366] 
fiscal stimuli -0.8381*     1.5148     
 [0.447]     [1.847]     
increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli  -0.6644     2.5359*    
  [0.804]     [1.298]    
expansionary fiscal stimuli   -0.7691*     1.5148   
   [0.443]     [1.847]   
successful fiscal stimuli    -1.5150*     -4.0901**  
    [0.807]     [2.011]  
unsuccesful fiscal stimuli     -0.6115     2.6088** 
     [0.432]     [1.307] 
Constant -5.7248*** -5.5951*** -5.7589*** -5.6992*** -5.5641*** 23.122** 23.430** 23.122** 12.541* 20.086** 
  [0.935] [0.908] [0.937] [0.924] [0.925] [10.402] [10.360] [10.402] [6.574] [10.214] 
Observations 449 449 449 448 448 72 72 72 72 72 
χ2 0.95 1.123 0.919 0.684 1.033 0.856 0.886 0.856 0.342 0.92 
Prob > χ2 0.33 0.289 0.338 0.408 0.31 0.355 0.347 0.355 0.559 0.337 
Note:  IV estimation of Tobit model.  Wald test of exogeneity is reported at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10: Regional analysis II. 
 APAC Latin America Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate 0.1013 0.1044 0.0984 0.0802 0.1265 -0.2052 -0.2148* -0.2102* -0.1956* -0.2347** -0.0486 -0.0343 -0.0344 -0.0378 -0.0509 
 [0.159] [0.158] [0.150] [0.151] [0.167] [0.125] [0.115] [0.120] [0.110] [0.118] [0.146] [0.149] [0.144] [0.145] [0.154] 
inequality 0.0069 0.007 0.0071 0.0153 0.0047 0.0233 0.0225 0.0234 0.0226 0.0211 0.0423 0.0422 0.0451 0.0439 0.0392 
 [0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.033] [0.045] [0.046] [0.046] [0.045] [0.046] [0.039] [0.041] [0.039] [0.041] [0.041] 
fiscal stimuli 0.0361     -0.0355     -0.705     
 [0.570]     [0.444]     [0.707]     
increasingly expansionary fiscal stimuli   0.3444     -0.6326     0.1554    
  [0.931]     [0.529]     [1.050]    
expansionary fiscal stimuli   0.178     -0.0507     -0.5121   
   [0.558]     [0.402]     [0.704]   
successful fiscal stimuli    -0.4621     0.5607     -0.4758  
    [1.033]     [0.479]     [0.935]  
unsuccesful fiscal stimuli     0.1827     -0.5558     -0.7165 
     [0.634]     [0.457]     [0.981] 
Constant -2.3580** -2.3836** -2.3768** -2.6116** -2.3661** -2.5816 -2.4828 -2.5786 -2.6375 -2.3387 -4.4464** -4.6936** -4.6764** -4.6959** -4.3915** 
  [1.084] [1.079] [1.080] [1.111] [1.098] [2.154] [2.206] [2.174] [2.183] [2.200] [1.940] [1.987] [1.913] [1.950] [2.021] 
Observations 225 225 225 215 218 317 317 317 317 317 150 150 150 150 150 
χ2 0.963 0.97 0.972 0.726 1.129 0.47 0.563 0.536 0.519 0.785 0.0842 0.144 0.142 0.119 0.0784 
Prob > χ2 0.326 0.325 0.324 0.394 0.288 0.493 0.453 0.464 0.471 0.375 0.772 0.704 0.707 0.73 0.78 
Note:  IV estimation of Tobit model. Wald test of exogeneity is reported at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Government crises CNTS 5878 0.16 0.51 
Real GDP growth rate WEO 8658 2.34 29.11 
Inequality SWIID 2503 37.97 10.55 
military DPI 5646 0.20 0.40 
stabs  DPI 5377 0.12 0.28 
system  DPI 5650 0.78 0.92 
govfrac POLITY IV 4800 0.19 0.27 
polity2 POLITY IV 6192 0.92 7.48 
durable DPI 6229 22.03 28.90 
polcomp POLITY IV 6010 5.46 3.72 
yrsoffc DPI 5658 7.39 7.62 
maj DPI 4797 0.71 0.22 
party_coal DPI 5619 1.57 1.26 
 
